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to Title IX Litigation
James S. Wrona*
I. INTRODUCTION
Education is crucial in an industrialized and highly technical society.'
This is true not only for individuals who hope to use their education to
gain employment,2 but also for any nation that hopes to keep pace in
* Judicial Clerk for United States District Court Judge A. Andrew Hauk, Central
District of California. B.A. 1990, York College of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1993, Ohio North-
ern University College of Law. Admitted to the bar, 1993, Maryland.
1. See JOHN JAROLIMEK, THE SCHOOLS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOCIAL CURRENTS, ISSUES, AND FORCES 22 (1981). "Today some seventy out of every
one hundred workers are employed in ... occupations such as medical and health
care, education, social welfare, technical services, research .... and so on. All of
these occupations require a constant stream of competently trained people who re-
quire higher and higher levels of education." Id. See also James B. Hunt, Education
for Economic Growth: A Critical Investment, reprinted in EDWARD STEVENS &
GEORGE H. WOOD, JUSTICE, IDEOLOGY, AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION 125 (1987). The article suggests that:
[T]hroughout history, the U.S. educational system has been challenged to
meet the changing needs of a growing, complex society. Since the Russian
launching of Sputnik in 1957 the American education system has not faced a
greater challenge than the one it faces today. Today, America is in danger of
losing the worldwide economic and technological leadership that it has built
up over generations.
Id.
2. Ronald Kutscher, Associate Commissioner for Economic Growth and Employ-
ment at the Labor Department's Bureau of Labor Statistics, stated, "The movement of
jobs is clearly in the direction of those requiring more education." Spencer Rich,
Economic Fortunes Fading For America's Less-Educated; Prime Blue-Collar Jobs
Evaporating, WASH. POST, June 2, 1988, at Al. See also Torsten Husen, The School in
the Achievement-Oriented Society: Crisis and Reform, reprinted in EDWARD STEVENS
an extremely competitive global market.3 Colleges and universities play
a vital role in students' personal growth as well as their preparation for
future careers. Sexual discrimination in education," however, may pre-
vent many women from reaching their full academic potential and limit
their career options.' For instance, certain testing devices may consis-
tently and disproportionately exclude qualified women from receiving
academic scholarships or financial grants.6 Additionally, the criteria for
admission utilized by some institutions of higher learning may adversely
affect women.' The discriminatory effects of these practices create
& GEORGE H. WOOD, JUSTICE, IDEOLOGY, AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SO-
CIAL FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION 132, 133 (1987) ("Competition for employment in-
creasingly revolves around such school records as grades, test scores, and degrees.");
Jarolimek, supra note 1, at 22-23 ("[E]ducation in the postindustrial society is the
prerequisite to survival."); ROBERT J. PARELIUS & ANN P. PARELIUS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
EDUCATION 66 (2d ed. 1987) ("Jobs that promise the maintenance of a middle-class
lifestyle often require a college diploma, and many require an advanced degree as
well.").
3. See George C. Keller, The Search For "Brainpower", reprinted in EDWARD
STEVENS & GEORGE H. WOOD, JUSTICE, IDEOLOGY, AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION 115 (1987). "Obviously, a complex, highly
technological society faced with serious international problems requires ever greater
numbers of persons with developed intellects." Id. at 124. See also PARELIUS &
PARELIUS, supra note 2, at 81 ("[Elducational institutions, especially at the college and
university level, contribute to economic development.").
4. See SARA DELAMONT, SEX ROLES AND THE SCHOOL: CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY OF
THE SCHOOL 104 (1980). "Data have been provided on inequalities between the sexes
in the provision of opportunities and facilities, inequalities in attainment, and differen-
tiation in classroom processes." Id.
5. The effects of sexual discrimination in education can have a long lasting detri-
mental impact on women's career plans. During the Senate debate on Title IX, Sena-
tor Bayh expressly recognized the ill-effects of sexual discrimination on women's
career plans, stating, "[Title IX] is a strong and comprehensive measure which I be-
lieve is needed if we are to provide women with solid legal protection as they seek
education and training for later careers . . . ." 118 CONG. REC. 5806-07 (1972).
6. See Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
The Sharif court noted that the State's practice of awarding academic scholarships
based solely on SAT scores has afforded males a disproportionately higher chance of
receiving scholarships than women. Id. at 355-56. See also SUSAN L. GABRIEL & ISAIAH
SMITHSON, GENDER IN THE CLASSROOM: POWER AND PEDAGOGY 1 (1990). "Sex bias be-
gins as soon as women apply for admission to college. Women students receive 28
percent less in grants and 16 percent less in loans than do males, and females are
more likely to withdraw due to financial problems than are males." Id. (citing Myra
Sadker, Sex Bias in Colleges and Universities, The Report Card, No. 2 (Washington,
D.C.: Mid-Atlantic Center for Sex Equality and Project EFFECT, American University,
1984)). See generally Recent Case, Civil Rights-Disparate-Impact Doctrine-Court
Prohibits Awarding Scholarships on the Basis of Standardized Tests that
Discriminatorily Impact Women--Sharif v. New York State Education Department,
103 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1990) [hereinafter Civil Rights-Disparate-Impact Doctrine].
7. See Sharif, 709 F. Supp. at 354. "[Tlhe SAT underpredicts academic perfor-
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barriers that severely limit individuals' career choices and personal
development.8 Further, practices adversely affecting women in educa-
tion are not only detrimental to individuals, but also impair the ability
of the country as a whole to keep pace in the global economy.' If the
criteria used in awarding scholarships, granting admissions, or placing
students in particular programs are affecting women in a discriminatory
manner, this country is denied the benefit of having the most qualified
persons trained in the most needed fields. Testing mechanisms that
adversely affect women do not accurately reflect the ability of the indi-
vidual in a particular field.1" Universities' use of such tests deny wom-
mance of females in their freshman year of college, and overpredicts such academic
performance for males." Id. (emphasis added). The Sharif court noted that "absent
discriminatory causes, [the likelihood] that women would consistently score 60 points
less on the SAT than men is nearly zero." Id. at 362. Therefore, when colleges and
universities overemphasize SAT scores in their admission policies, women are ad-
versely impacted. To combat this discriminatory effect, "researchers recommend that
college admissions counselors use a combination of high school grades and test
scores because this combination provides the highest correlation with freshman
grades." Id. at 354. In addition, "the National Association of College Admissions
Counselors' (NACAC) Code of Ethics requires member institutions to refrain from
using minimum test scores as the sole criterion for admission . . . ." Id. See also
GABRIEL & SMITHSON, supra note 6, at 2. "In spite of the repeatedly demonstrated
lack of correlation between women's performance in classwork and their scoring on
the Scholastic Aptitude Test, admissions boards continue to use SAT scores to deny
admission to some women and to disqualify others from financial support." Id.
8. Phyllis L. Crocker & Anne E. Simon, Sexual Harassment In Education, 10
CAP. U. L. REV. 541, 542 (1981). "Formal education is, in the United States, an impor-
tant factor in an individual's career possibilities and personal development; there-
fore . . .obstructing that person's educational accomplishments can have severe con-
sequences." Id. Crocker and Simon go on to state that "for those careers which re-
quire college degrees for further training, such as medicine, law, academics, and re-
search, students' college records take on tremendous importance for their later pros-
pects." Id. Thus, sexual discrimination may be even more debilitating for those need-
ing additional educational training.
9. One author suggests that, "No nation can afford to waste half of its human
resources; our nation's campuses must lead the way in developing and implementing
a blueprint for equity." KAREN BOGART, TOWARD EQUITY: AN ACTION MANUAL FOR WOM-
EN IN ACADEME 2 (1984). See also Hunt, supra note 1, at 129. "If we are to grow
economically, we must make a substantial investment in the education and training of
all our people." Id. (emphasis added).
10. See Civil Rights-Disparate-Impact Doctrine, supra note 6, at 806.
By invalidating tests that disadvantage women, disparate-impact analysis re-
jects the false assumption that test results reflect actual differences between
female and male intellects, and prevents the inequities that result when dis-
proportionate numbers of female students are denied equal access to educa-
en equal access to education and limits the country's ability to train
persons otherwise qualified in areas such as engineering, computer
science, and medicine." In today's competitive global market "no na-
tion can afford to waste half of its human resources ... ."12 However,
while not a new phenomenon, 3 sexual discrimination in education has
only recently gained recognition as a major problem in need of re-
dress."
In 1972 Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 (Title IX) in an attempt to alleviate the problems of sexual dis-
crimination in education.6 Title IX reads in pertinent part, "No person
in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving any Federal financial
assistance." 6 The administrative enforcement of Title IX rests with the
Office for Civil Rights, Department of Education (OCR).17 The OCR's
tional programs. Society has a fundamental commitment to provide nondis-
criminatory access to educational opportunities. Allocating such opportunities
by means of a test that discriminates against women undermines that princi-
ple.
Id. at 811 (footnotes omitted).
11. See generally supra note 8.
12. BOGART, supra note 9, at 2.
13. See BOGART, supra note 9, at 213 (noting that sexual harassment has been a
persistent problem in education); BARBARA A. BROWN ET AL., WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND
THE LAW; THE IMPACT OF THE ERA ON STATE. LAWS 302-04 (1977) (discussing long
history of discrimination against women in both the public and private educational
settings); MICHELE A. PALUDI, IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 2 (1990)
(recognizing that women have always had to face sexual discrimination); MYRA P.
SADKER & DAVID M. SADKER, SEX EQUITY HANDBOOK FOR SCHOOLS 5 (1982) ("[Als far
back as 1946, studies documented the extensive sex bias in textbooks."). See general-
ly Jill L. Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance Travelled
and the Distance Yet To Go, 10 CAP. U. L. REV. 447 (1981).
14. See MARGARET A. BERGER, LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF WOMEN 6 (1981) (noting
the long history of discrimination against women but stating that "the concerted ef-
fort to achieve equal rights for women through the use of the courts has a far more
recent history"); BOGART, supra note 9, at 1 ("Sex discrimination is seen as a legiti-
mate issue .and concern, in contrast to the almost total lack of awareness earlier.").
15. "In 1972, the provisions ultimately enacted as Title IX were introduced in the
Senate by Senator Bayh during debate on the Education Amendments of 1972." North
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 524 (1982). During the debate, Senator
Bayh stated, "[Tihe heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex discrimination
in educational programs receiving Federal funds." 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972). See
also 117 CONG. REC. 39, 252 (1971) (statement of Rep. Mink) ("[I]nstitutions should
not be asking the taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimination.
Millions of women pay taxes into the Federal treasury and we collectively resent that
these funds should be used for the support of institutions to which [women] are de-
nied equal access.").
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1972).
17. BILLIE W. DZIECH & LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR: SEXUAL HARASS-
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main enforcement technique, established by Congress, is the office's
ability to terminate or refuse to grant federal assistance to programs
that violate Title IX's discriminatory prohibitions. 8
While Title IX was not originally seen as an effective deterrent to the
problems of sexual discrimination, 9 judicial and legislative action has
broadened its scope and the remedies available. For instance, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court, in Cannon v. University of Chicago,0 held
that an individual may bring a private right of action to enforce Title
IX's prohibitions.2 Title IX has also been interpreted to reach em-
MENT ON CAMPUS 19 (2d ed. 1990) (Title IX administered by the Office for Civil
Rights).
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1972). Section 1682 states that a violation of § 1681 may be
dealt with under this section in the following manner:
(1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under
such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an
express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to
comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limit-
ed to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to
whom such a finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the
particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been
so found ....
Id.
19. See BERGER, supra note 14, at 45 (noting a total lack of implementation by the
agency required to enforce Title IX); MALVINA HALBERSTAM & ELIZABETH F. DEFEIS,
WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ERA? 83 (1987)
("Title IX sanctions are indirect and their effectiveness is limited."); SADKER &
SADKER, supra note 13, at 1 ("Years after the passage of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, sex bias and discrimination still permeate school life."); Elaine
D. Ingulli, Sexual Harassment in Education, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 281, 292 (1987) (Ter-
mination of federal funding is a limited avenue for bringing a claim of discrimina-
tion.); see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Court stat-
ed that the remedy under Title IX is "severe and often may not provide an appro-
priate means [of enforcement] . . . ." Id. at 705. The Court also noted that under the
similar enforcement provisions of Title VI, "Congress itself has noted the severity of
the fund-cutoff remedy and has described it as a last resort . . . ." Id. at 706 n.38
(citing 110 Cong. Rec. 7067 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff)). Senator Ribicoff
stated, "Personally, I think it would be a rare case when funds would actually be cut
off." Id.
20. 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979).
21. In Cannon, the petitioner alleged that she was denied admission to medical
school based on her sex. Id. at 680. In dismissing the action, the court of appeals
found that no private right of action exists under Title IX. Id. However, the Supreme
Court reversed. Id. at 717. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated, "Title IX
presents the atypical situation in which all of the circumstances that the Court hag
previously identified as supportive of an implied remedy are present. We therefore
ployees of educational facilities.22 Further, in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools,' the Supreme Court recently held that damage
remedies may be used in cases brought to enforce Title IX.
The legislature has also broadened the application of Title IX. In
1986, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act,25
which abrogates the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in actions
alleging a violation of Title IX.2  In 1988, the Civil Rights Restoration
Act 7 further broadened the scope of Title IX by applying Title IX on
an institution-wide basis rather than on a program-specific basis.' Ad-
conclude that petitioner may maintain her lawsuit, despite the absence of any express
authorization for it in the statute." Id. at 717.
22. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). After an extensive re-
view of the legislative histories of Title IX and Title VI, the Court concluded that
"employment discrimination comes within the prohibition of Title IX." Id. at 530.
23. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
24. In Franklin, a high school student brought a Title IX claim against Gwinett
County School District for alleged sexual harassment by one of its teachers. Id. at
1031. The student sought damages, but both the district court and the court of ap-
peals found that "Title IX does not authorize an award of damages." Id. at 1032. The
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "a damages remedy is available for an ac-
tion brought to enforce Title IX." Id. at 1038.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1986).
26. Id. Section 2000d-7 of the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act states: "(1) A
state shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of. . . title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972, [or] title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . ." Id. The
Act was a direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). In Scanlon the Court held that Congress had to "un-
equivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits
against the States in federal court." Id. at 242 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)). Because the Court found that there was no
such Congressional language present in regard to Title VI, the State could use its
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 240. The Act now unequivocally states that no
Eleventh Amendment immunity may be used in a Title VI or Title IX case. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-7 (1986).
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988).
28. Id. The Civil Rights Restoration Act reversed the Supreme Court's decision in
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). In Grove City, the Court held that
the language in Title IX was program-specific. Id. at 571. Under the Court's holding,
only the specific program that received financial assistance from the federal govern-
ment could be regulated under Title IX. Id. at 572. However, the Civil Rights Res-
toration Act subsequently mandated that Title IX is to be applied on an institution-
wide basis. 20 U.S.C. § 1687. The Act states in pertinent part: "For the purposes of
this title, the term 'program or activity' and 'program' mean all of the operations
of . . . . (2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public
system of higher education . . . ." Id. For a detailed look at the differences between
program-specific and institution-wide treatment of Title IX, see Brian T. Must, Com-
ment, Title IX and the Future of Private Education: Backdoor Regulation of a Pri-
vate Entity, 22 TULSA L.J. 109 (1986).
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ditionally, in 1991 Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. 1988(b), which allows
plaintiffs bringing suit under Title IX the right to receive attorney's fees
in certain circumstances. 29 These judicial and legislative responses to
Title IX have answered many questions regarding actions brought under
the Act.
However, one area remains uncertain under Title IX. Neither the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court nor Congress has addressed whether a plain-
tiff may prove sexual discrimination under Title IX by using disparate-
impact analysis." Unlike other forms of proof of discrimination, which
center on a showing of intent to discriminate, disparate-impact analysis
focuses on whether a policy, neutral on its face, has a disproportionate
adverse impact upon a protected group.3 As discussed above, a num-
ber of testing devices adversely impact women in education.' Because
such tests rarely evince an actual intent to discriminate, women ad-
versely affected will be left without a remedy unless disparate-impact
analysis is adopted in Title IX cases. One article states, "The disparate-
impact analysis.., redresses bias in standardized testing more effec-
tively than would an intent standard .... In such cases, proving intent
to discriminate would be an extremely difficult, if not impossible, bur-
den to satisfy."' Because of the significance of disparate-impact analy-
sis in these types of cases, and because the issue is unsettled, extending
a disparate-impact test to Title IX cases of sex discrimination should
prove to be the next major battleground in Title IX litigation.
This article will first discuss the differences between disparate impact
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. III 1991). This section states that, "In any action or
proceeding to enforce a provision of . . . title IX . . . the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs." Id.
30. See Civil Rights-Disparate-Impact Doctrine, supra note 6, at 806. "Few
courts have considered whether plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent in title IX
claims." Id.; see also Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area School Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 788 (3rd.
Cir. 1990) ("[n]either the Supreme Court nor this court has decided specifically
whether intent is a necessary element of a Title IX claim"); Sharif v. New York State
Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[nleither the Supreme Court nor
any court in the Second Circuit has determined whether intent must be shown in
Title IX cases"); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (not-
ing that the law is undecided on question of whether Title XI requires finding of
intent to discriminate).
31. Ronna G. Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEx. L.
REV. 525, 554 (1987).
32. See supra notes 6 and 7.
33. Civil Rights-Disparate-Impact Doctrine, supra note 6, at 811.
and disparate treatment. Then the viability of using a disparate-impact
theory will be analyzed by focusing on how courts have interpreted
statutes that are analogous to Title IX. Specifically, this paper will look
to the approach taken by courts in cases involving Title VI, Title VII and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Finally, this article
will review cases where lower courts have allowed the use of disparate-
impact analysis in Title IX litigation.
II. DISPARATE TREATMENT V. DISPARATE IMPACT
Before examining whether disparate-impact analysis should be appli-
cable to Title IX suits, the differences between disparate impact and,
disparate treatment should be clarified. A plaintiff using disparate
treatment to prove discrimination must show that the defendant intend-
ed to discriminate.' Dissimilarly, under a disparate-impact theory, the
focus is not on intent but, rather, on whether a facially neutral policy
has a disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group.35 Howev-
er, this distinction does not fully explain the complexity of the two
approaches. A more detailed review is needed to understand the signifi-
cance of the differences between them.
A. Disparate Treatment
The United States Supreme Court first discussed the disparate-treat-
ment theory of discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.'
The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas claimed that an employer had dis-
criminated against him because of his race in violation of Title VII.37
The critical question before the Supreme Court was the allocation and
burden of proof in an intentional discrimination case where no direct
evidence was available.' As a result, the Court enunciated a three-
34. Schneider, supra note 31, at 553. However, unlike a case where direct evi-
dence of discriminatory motive is available, disparate-treatment cases allow the plain-
tiff to infer the discriminatory intent from circumstantial evidence. See Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) ("Proof of discriminatory
motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact
of differences in treatment."). See also Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof
in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV.
1205, 1227-28 (1981) (discriminatory intent in disparate-treatment case may be in-
ferred).
35. See Schneider, supra note 31, at 554.
36. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
37. Id. at 794. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that McDonnell Douglas Corp.'s hir-
ing procedure was discriminatory. Id.
38. Id. at 800.
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prong test to be applied in disparate-treatment cases.3
First, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination.' A prima facie case merely raises an inference
of discrimination because the Court presumes that those acts com-
plained of, "if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on
the consideration of impermissible factors."4 However, a prima facie
showing does not amount to a final finding of discrimination.42
Second, if the plaintiff meets the requirements of the first step, the
burden shifts to the employer to show that the reasons for rejecting the
employee were not discriminatory.43 However, the burden that shifts to
the employer is one of production, not persuasion." The Court made
39. Id. at 802-05.
40. Id. at 802. The Court discussed the elements of a prima facie case. A plaintiff
claiming a discriminatory hiring practice must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the po-
sition remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id.
In a discriminatory firing situation the elements of a prima facie case would be
somewhat different. A plaintiff would have to show: (i) that he was a member of a
protected class; (ii).that he was qualified; (iii) that, despite his adequate performance
of the job, he was fired; and (iv) that the position remained open and the employer
took applications for the position. See SCIILEI & GROSSMAN, infra note 44, at 473 (Five-
Year Cumulative Supplement). "Courts do not rigidly apply the McDonnell Douglas test,
but fashion its elements to the facts of a particular case. For example, prima facie
case requirements have been adapted for religious discrimination cases, discipline cas-
es, and cases involving an academic setting." Id. (citations omitted).
41. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). In Furnco the court
of appeals found that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. Id. at 576. The Supreme Court agreed. Id. at 576. However, the Court took
exception with the weight that the court of appeals gave to the prima facie showing.
Id. The Supreme Court stated that "the Court of Appeals went awry ... in apparent-
ly equating a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas with an ultimate finding
of fact as to discriminatory refusal to hire under Title VII .... " Id.
42. Id.
43. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
44. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259-60 (1981). Sub-
sequent to the McDonnell Douglas holding and prior to the Court's decision in
Burdine, many lower courts had problems implementing this second phase of the
test. See BARBARA L SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1306
(2d ed. 1988). Compare Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980) ("It is
enough for the defendants in the second phase of the case to bring forth evidence
this clear in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,45
when it emphasized that the employer is not required to show that its
reasons were nondiscriminatory by a preponderance of evidence.46
Rather, the employer need only "articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for the employee's rejection."47 The plaintiff has the
ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination under a disparate-
treatment analysis.4
Third, even if the employer offers a nondiscriminatory reason for its
decision, the plaintiff must be given the opportunity to show, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the employer's reasons were in fact a
pretext for discrimination.4'
that they acted on a neutral basis. They do not have the burden of establishing that
their basis was sound."); Ambush v. Montgomery County Gov't, 620 F.2d 1048, 1052
(4th Cir. 1980) ("The defendant, in turn, may rebut such prima facie showing by ex-
plaining what he has done or producing evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
sons.") (quoting Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1978)) with
Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[W]e hold
that the employer bears the burden of proving the legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for his actions by a preponderance of the evidence"); Vaughn v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 620 F.2d 655, 659 (8th Cir. 1980) ("The employer bears the burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason exists
factually.").
45. 450 U.S. 248.(1981).
46. Id. at 259-60.
47. Id. at 260.
48. Id. at 253. See also Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S.
867 (1984). The Supreme Court again emphasized that, "The ultimate burden of per-
suading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff regarding the particular employment decision 'remains at all times with the
plaintiff . . . ." Id. at 875 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
49. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). During this sec-
ond stage, the employer in McDonnell Douglas argued that it did not rehire the plain-
tiff because he had been involved in unlawful conduct against the corporation. Id. at
803. The Court found that the employer's stated reason was sufficient to discharge its
burden of proof. Id. However, it remanded the case to give the plaintiff an opportu-
nity to show that the employer's reason was a pretext. Id. at 804. The Court also
gave examples of the type of evidence that would support a showing that the
employer's explanation was a pretext, stating that, "Especially relevant to such a
showing would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against petitioner
of comparable seriousness to the 'stall-in' were nevertheless retained or rehired." Id.
The Court also opined that statistics showing a pattern of discrimination would also
be relevant. Id. at 805.
It is at this third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis where most plaintiffs
either win or lose on their discrimination claims. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 44,
at 1316-17.
Because of the plaintiffs easy burden of establishing a prima facie case of
disparate treatment and because defendants can normally satisfy the burden
of articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action in
question ... the great majority of disparate treatment cases turn on the.
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Under McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, a plaintiff may show dis-
crimination using disparate-treatment analysis, allowing the trier of fact
to infer intentional discrimination. It is important to remember, howev-
er, that an intent to discriminate must be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence.
B. Disparate Impact
Disparate impact, unlike disparate treatment, does not require a
showing of intentional discrimination.' Instead, the focus is on the
consequences of the complained-of practice." The leading case involv-
ing disparate-impact analysis is Griggs v. Duke Power Co.52 The Griggs
Court enunciated a three-prong test for cases using disparate-impact
analysis.' Although Griggs involved a Title VII claim of discrimina-
tion,' courts have subsequently applied the Griggs analysis to other
anti-discrimination statutes."
In Griggs, the employer used an aptitude test to determine whether
persons were qualified for certain jobs.' The plaintiffs brought a Title
VII action claiming racial discrimination." The district court and the
court of appeals found that the adoption of the tests was not racially
plaintiffs ability to demonstrate that the nondiscriminatory reason offered by
the employer was a pretext for discrimination.
Id. (citations omitted).
50. See supra text accompanying note 35.
51. Id. See also SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 44, at 1324.
52. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
53. Id. at 432. See also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 44647 (1982).
54. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426.
55. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 592 (1983) (claims
brought under Title VI's regulations subject to Griggs disparate-impact analysis);
Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316
(10th Cir.) (Title VII disparate-impact treatment allowed in Title IX cases), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984) (Ti-
tle VII disparate-impact analysis may be used in ADEA case); Sharif v. New York
State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying Griggs disparate-
impact analysis to Title IX litigation); Reilly v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins.
Co., 653 F. Supp. 725, 729-33 (D.N.J. 1987) (using Title VII disparate-impact analysis
in ADEA case); Popko v. City of Clairton, 570 F. Supp. 446, 451 (W.D. Pa. 1983)
("ADEA plaintiff, like a plaintiff under Title VII . . . may prevail if he or she can
prove . . . disparate impact").
56. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
57. Id. at 426.
motivated.' Therefore, the employer's hiring and promotion criteria
were not actionable under Title VII.' The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and reversed the lower courts' holdings.' The Court stated that
"[t]he Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."61
In Connecticut v. Teal,' the Court distilled the Griggs disparate-im-
pact analysis into a three-prong test:
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that the fa-
cially neutral employment practice had a significantly discriminatory impact. If
that showing is made, the employer must then demonstrate that 'any given re-
quirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in question,' in order to
avoid a finding of discrimination. Even in such a case, however, the plaintiff may
prevail, if he shows that the employer was using the practice as a mere pretext
for discrimination.'
Thus, under the Griggs formula, the plaintiff must first make out a
prima facie case that the employer's practice had a substantially adverse
effect on an identifiable group." This is usually done through the intro-
duction of statistical analysis tending to show that minorities or women
have been adversely affected.' For example, a plaintiff may introduce
proof that, on average, minorities scored disproportionately lower on the
employer's hiring test than non-minority applicants. However, the statis-
tical proof showing a disparity must be sufficiently tailored to the type of
employment at issue.' For instance, a plaintiff attempting to use popu-
lation/workforce comparisons must base the analysis on the relationship•
between the particular jobs at issue and the relevant number of qualified
persons in the job market.67 Therefore, where the position applied for
requires specific job skills, the plaintiffs statistical analysis must focus
on the adverse effect of the employer's criteria on those minorities in the
58. Id. at 429.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 436.
61. Id. at 431. The Court further stated that, "[tihe touchstone is business necessi-
ty. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to
be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id.
62. 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982).
63. Id. at 446-47 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted).
64. Id.
65. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977). See also SCHLE1 &
GROSSMAN, supra note 44, at 1326. "In attempting to establish a prima facie case, the
plaintiff may introduce, among others, the following types of statistical proof: pass/fail
comparisons, population/work force comparisons, or regression analysis or other types
of statistical comparisons." Id.
66. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989).
67. Id.
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general area who possess the skills needed for the position. Simply using
figures from the general population will usually be insufficient.' Fur-
ther, the plaintiff normally has to show that "specific elements of the
[employer's] hiring process have a significantly disparate impact" on the
identifiable group.'
If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the inquiry turns to
whether the defendant can show its policy has a "manifest relationship
to the employment in question."7" This stage of a disparate-impact dis-
crimination case was the source of much confusion.
One area of difficulty was the character of the burden carried by the
defendant. For instance, did the defendant have the burden of persuasion
or merely one of putting forth some evidence of business justification?"
The Supreme Court put that question to rest, albeit momentarily, in
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio.2 The Court stated that "the
employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business justi-
fication for his employment practice. The burden of persuasion... re-
mains with the disparate-impact plaintiff."3 However, Congress over-
turned this portion of Wards Cove when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of
68. Id. However, in some cases, when the jobs at issue do not usually require
specific training, or when the employer expects to train the new employees, using
the general population may be acceptable. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329-30 (1977).
69. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658. However, in certain circumstances the plaintiff
will not be required to show that a particular employment procedure had a disparate
impact on the identifiable group. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-
2(K)(1)(B)(i) (1991). "[11f the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the
elements of a respondent's decision-making process are not capable of separation for
analysis, the. decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice."
Id. Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) was enacted in direct response to the Wards Cove
decision which held that separate policies could never be analyzed as one employ-
ment practice. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 655-59.
70. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
71. ScHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 44, at 1328. Before recent developments in
this area of the law, the authors stated, "There is an open question as to the nature
of the burden that shifts to the defendant .... " Id.
72. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
73. Id. at 649.
1991."4 "The new law shifts the burden of demonstrating business justifi-
cation squarely back onto the defendant."7"
Another area that caused confusion was determining what the defen-
dant needed to show under the second prong of the analysis."6 Griggs
held that an employer could justify its hiring practice by showing it was
a "business necessity."77 The Court in Wards Cove reversed course, hold-
ing that "there is no requirement that the challenged practice be
'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business to pass mus-
ter."' The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also addressed this portion of the
Court's decision. The Act essentially returned the law to where it was
prior to Ward's Cove.'9 Therefore, a defendant will now have to prove
there was a "business necessity" for using its policy under the second
prong of the Griggs test.' However, exactly what the phrase "business
necessity" means is difficult to ascertain given the trouble that courts
have had in interpreting it in past cases.8 ' Nevertheless, it is clear that
something more than the limited showing enunciated in Wards Cove is
needed.2
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1991). That section states:
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is estab-
lished under this subchapter only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular em-
ployment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consis-
tent with business necessity ....
Id. (emphasis added).
75. LEX K. LARSON, CIVIL RIGHTs AcT OF 1991 24 (1992). The author supports his
conclusion by focusing on the requirement in the section that the defendant must
"demonstrate." Id. at 21. Larson notes that "'demonstrate' is defined to include the
burdens of production and persuasion." Id. (citing Title VII § 701(m), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(m), added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 104).
76. Id. at 23 (stating that the extent of employer's obligation left lower courts in
confusion). The author noted that "the Court described this burden sometimes as one
of showing a 'manifest relation of the employer rule to the employment in question'
(implying a light burden), and sometimes as one of showing that it is 'necessary to
safe and efficient job performance' (implying a heavier burden)." Id. at 22 (quoting
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 330 n.14 (1977)).
77. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
78. Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). See also
LARSON, supra note 75, at 19.
79. See LARSON, supra note 75, at 22.
80. See supra note 61.
81. See supra note 76.
82. See LARSON, supra note 75, at 24. "Many unanswered questions remain, but at
a minimum the presence of the term 'necessity' operates as a reminder that the job
relatedness requirement is not a trivial one . . . ." Id.
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Lastly, even if the defendant is able to articulate a business necessity
for its practice, the plaintiff must be given the opportunity to demon-
strate that the procedure was a pretext for discrimination.' A plaintiff
may do this by showing that "other tests or selection devices, without a
similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legiti-
mate [hiring] interest[s] .... "' A plaintiff using disparate-impact analy-
sis should therefore collect information on alternative testing devices
that the employer could have implemented. By way of illustration, if
company A used one test that had a disproportionate effect on minori-
ties, but company B, which was in the same type of business, used a
different test that did not discriminate, introduction of company B's test
would be evidence that company A's procedure was a pretext for dis-
crimination.
C. Overview of Distinctions
In summation, a number of distinctions exist between the two forms
of analysis. Those differences must be kept in mind when trying to ascer-
tain both the impact and the relevance of extending disparate-effect
proof of discrimination to Title IX. The most important distinction is that
the focus of disparate impact is on a facially neutral practice that has a
disproportionate effect on a class, not on the defendant's intent to dis-
criminate.' This in turn leads to a different approach for the plaintiff at
the prima facie stage. The disparate-treatment plaintiff must meet the
four requirements set forth under the first prong of the McDonnell Doug-
las test, which permits intent to be inferred.' On the other hand, the
83. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982).
84. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989) (quoting
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)). The Court in Wards Cove
attached a new requirement to this part of the disparate-impact analysis as well. The
Court held that any alternative practice must be as effective as the one the defen-
dant had chosen. Id. at 661. The Court also held that "costs or other burdens" would
be pertinent in deciding whether the alternative practice was as effective. Id.
However, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 effectively did away with this added re-
quirement. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (1991). This section states that the required
showing for a valid alternative employment practice "shall be in accordance with the
law as it existed on June 4, 1989 .... " Id. Wards Cove was decided on June 5,
1989. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 642.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
86. See supra note 34.
disparate-impact plaintiffs prima facie case will consist mainly of statisti-
cal evidence which shows a differential effect.
87
Another distinction is made at the second stage of the respective tests.
Under disparate-treatment, the defendant need only show "some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."' The de-
fendant does not have the burden of persuasion,' which at all times
remains with the plaintiff.' However, in a disparate-impact case, the
defendant shoulders the burden of persuading the trier of fact that its
practice was a business necessity.'
Additionally, the plaintiffs burden in the third stage of the disparate-
impact analysis is distinctive. The plaintiff must show that an alternative
test would serve the employer's interest without having the same dis-
criminatory effect.2
The distinctions between the two types of proof needed to support a
discrimination claim are important for a number of reasons. First, the
outcome of a case will many times turn on which analysis is used."
More importantly, however, the differences in the two approaches illumi-
nate the distinctive policy considerations and goals present in each. 4
That is, if the courts interpret the language of the statute or regulation
under which the claim is being brought as narrow in focus, an intent
requirement is usually proper. The converse is that if the aim were to
prohibit all forms of discrimination, then disparate-impact analysis is
appropriate.
III. EXTENDING DISPARATE-IMPACT ANALYSIS TO TITLE IX
Whether to extend disparate-impact analysis to sex discrimination
claims under Title IX is an important question. In education, the use of
certain testing devices results in discrimination against women.9" How-
ever, the criteria used rarely manifest an intent to discriminate." The
87. See supra text accompanying note 65.
88. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra text accompanying note 75.
92. See supra text accompanying note 84.
93. See Belton, supra note 34, at 1231. "[Tlhe same set of operative facts may
yield a different outcome on liability depending upon which discrimination theory a
court chooses to use." Id. See also SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 44, at 489 (5th
supp.) (explaining that it is not infrequent for a plaintiff to win on one but not both
theories).
94. See Belton, supra note 34, at 1287 (noting that policy considerations are an
integral part of the different approaches).
95. See supra notes 6 and 7.
96. See generally Civil Rights-Disparate-Impact Doctrine, supra note 6, at 806.
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only way to remedy those discriminatory practices is to extend disparate-
impact analysis to Title IX cases." By failing to extend such forms of
proof, certain types of discrimination against women will survive, there-
by rendering Title IX ineffective, except for the most blatant forms of sex
discrimination in education. Because of Title IX's recent history, a review
of cases that have applied disparate-impact analysis to other discrimi-
nation statutes will help predict whether such forms of proof will be
accepted in Title IX litigation.
The most important case using disparate-impact analysis is Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. ' To identify whether the Griggs logic justifies expand-
ing disparate-impact analysis to Title IX litigation, it is important to ex-
amine the policy reasons that led the Griggs Court to adopt the effects
test. In Griggs, the Court stated that "good intent or absence of discrimi-
natory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mecha-
nisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups .... ""
The Court expressly recognized that minority groups had historically
been discriminated against."° In allowing the plaintiff to use disparate-
impact proof of discrimination, the Court acknowledged the important
interests involved in removing societal discriminatory practices, regard-
less of intent.
Those same concerns are present in sex discrimination cases brought
under Title IX. Courts have recognized that sex, like race, is an immuta-
ble characteristic.' ° Moreover, women, like racial minorities, have tra-
The article discusses the difficulty of proving an intent to discriminate in these types
of situations. Id.
97. Id. at 807-08.
98. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs involved a Title 'VII
case of race discrimination. Title VII reads in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964) (emphasis added).
99. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
100. Id. at 434. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806
(1973). "Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the education
and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control, not
be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens for the re-
mainder of their lives." Id.
101. See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 n.4 (6th Cir. 1975). Although
Laugesen was an ADEA case, the court noted the importance of the immutable char-
ditionally experienced discrimination in education.' 2 Further, the Su-
preme Court has acknowledged the similar discriminatory treatment of
women and blacks. For example, in Connecticut v. Teal,"w the Court
stated that the intent of Title VII was to remove the barriers "that had
historically been encountered by women and blacks as well as other
minorities."'" Thus, the types of societal discrimination recognized in
Griggs are similarly present in Title IX cases. The public interest in erad-
icating the impact of sex discrimination in education equals the Griggs
Court's concern of eliminating the discriminatory effects of deficient
education for minority persons. Therefore, a disparate-impact test seems
appropriate in the Title IX arena.
Additional support for extending disparate-impact analysis may be
found in the similar objectives of Title VII and Title IX. Both statutes
prohibit sex discrimination. This nexus led the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Mabry v. Board of Community Colleges & Occupational
Education,"° to conclude that the same substantive standards should
be applied for sex discrimination under Title VII and Title IX.1  The
acteristics of race, sex and national origin in deciding whether to allow disparate-
impact analysis. Id. at 313.
102. See BROWN, supra note 13, at 302. "Public and private educational institutions
have long been characterized by discrimination against women and girls." Id. See also
supra notes 13 and 14. Similar to the history of discrimination against women in the
school setting, the barriers referred to in the Griggs opinion were the inadequate
education that many minority students received because of discrimination. See Con-
necticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982). See also Drew S. Days, Enemies or Allies?
Widening the Scope of Coqflict, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1621, 1627 (1988). Supreme Court
applied disparate-impact test in Griggs due to "backdrop of racial discrimination in
education . . . ." Id.
Courts have also recognized the historical discrimination against women outside
the educational context, as in the area of salaries. See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691
F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982). "Even with a business-related requirement, an employer
might assert some business reason as a pretext for a discriminatory objective. This
possibility is especially great with a factor like prior salary which can easily be used
to capitalize on the unfairly low salaries historically paid to women." Id. See also
Futran v. RING Radio Co., 501 F. Supp. 734, 739 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (noting the his-
torically low salaries of women); Neeley v. Metropolitan Area Rapid Transit Auth., 24
F.E.P. 1610, 1611 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
103. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
104. Id. at 447.
105. 813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987).
106. Id. at 316-17 n.6. In Mabry, a female physical education instructor brought
Title VII and Title IX claims of sex discrimination after being fired from a junior col-
lege. Id. at 313. The district court dismissed the Title IX claim. Id. The district court
ruled in favor of the defendant on the Title VII claim at the end of the trial. Id. On
appeal, the plaintiff contented that the district court erred in dismissing her Title IX
claim. Id. at 313-14. The court of appeals held that because Mabry did not appeal the
district court's final judgment on her Title VII claim, an essential element of her Title
IX claim was already decided, thus precluding any subsequent Title IX claim. Mabry,
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Mabry court noted that because both statutes prohibited indistinguish-
able behavior, it was proper to apply Title VII principles to a Title IX
case.10
A year after Mabry, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico,"° adopted an identical rationale when it ap-
plied Title VII's substantive standards to the Title IX litigation."° Lipsett
relied heavily upon the legislative history of Title IX in deciding that
disparate-impact analysis should be applied to cases brought under the
statute."' However, both Mabry and Lipsett dealt with university
employees' Title IX claims of discrimination rather than the usual stu-
dent-brought action. The legislative history relied on by the court in
Lipsett specifically limited the Title VII standard for showing discrimi-
nation to "employment-related claims under Title IX." Even though
Lipsett and Mabry involved plaintiffs who were employees of the defen-
dants, the analytical basis used by the courts for extending disparate-im-
pact analysis should apply to non-employee Title IX plaintiffs as well. As
one article suggests, "To employ a different analysis in education cases
813 F.2d at 314. In dicta, the court noted that the same substantive standards should
apply to both Title VII and Title IX claims, id. at 316-17, n.6, but finally concluded
that regardless of whether Title IX requires proof of intentional discriminatory con-
duct, Title IX sweeps no more broadly than Title VII, and Mabry's failure to appeal
the Title VII decision ended her Title IX claim as well. Id. at 318.
107. Id. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMINATION § 7.45(b)
(1987) (Title VII analysis should be applied in Title IX employment discrimination).
See also Ingulli, supra note 19, at 295. "[Tlhe law defining 'sexual discrimination'
under Title VII has been relied upon by the courts to define illegal sexual dis-
crimination under Title IX." Id.
108. 864 F.2d 881 (Ist Cir. 1988).
109. Id. at 896 (quoting Mabry, 813 F.2d at 316 n.6). "And, at least two other
courts have implied that the standards governing claims arising under Title VII and
Title IX were the same." Id. (citing O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632, 642
n.8 (8th Cir. 1986); Nagel v. Avon Bd. of Educ., 575 F. Supp. 105, 106 (D. Conn.
1983)).
110. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 896.
111. Id. at 897. The court in Lipsett quoted from the House Report on Title IX. The
House Report stated:
One of the single most important pieces of legislation which has prompted
the cause of equal employment opportunity is Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 .... Title VII, however, specifically excludes educational institu-
tions from its terms. Title IX would remove that exemption and bring those
in education under the equal employment provision.
Id. at 897 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 554, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2512).
would create inconsistency in Title IX enforcement mechanisms and
present a baseless distinction between sex discrimination in employment
and sex discrimination in education.""' In sum, because both Title VII
and Title IX prohibit sex discrimination, and because the underlying ra-
tionale for using disparate impact in Title VII cases is applicable to Title
IX claims, plaintiffs should be allowed to use proof of adverse effect to
show a violation of Title IX.
Courts have applied a similar approach in extending Title VII disparate-
impact analysis to cases involving another anti-discrimination statute.
The overwhelming majority of courts confronted with the question of
whether to expand the disparate-impact test to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act"3 (ADEA), have answered in the affirmative."4 Fur-
thermore, the rationale for this expansion is analogous to that used by
courts applying disparate-impact analysis to Title IX cases. For instance,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "the similar language,
structure and purpose of Title VII and the ADEA, as well as the similarity
of the analytic problems posed in interpreting the two statutes, has led
us to adopt disparate impact in cases under the ADEA.""
112.' Civil Rights-Disparate-Impact Doctrine, supra note 6, at 806-07.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1985). This section states:
(a)Employer practices
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age ....
Id.
114. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir. 1984) (dispa-
rate impact is proper in ADEA case); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d
686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying Title VIrs disparate-impact analysis to 'ADEA
claim); Allison v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 1982)
(disparate-impact analysis may be possible); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1034
(finding disparate-impact in ADEA case), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981) (2d Cir.
1980); Reilly v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 725, 729 (D.N.J.
1987) (allowing the use of the disparate-impact test in ADEA case); Popko v. City of
Clairton, 570 F. Supp. 446, 451 (WD. Pa. 1983) ("ADEA plaintiff, like a plaintiff under
Title VII ... may prevail if he or she can prove ... disparate impact"). But see
Dorsch v. LB. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1986). "The adverse impact analy-
sis developed in Title VII cases cannot be extended easily to age cases." Id. at 1428
(citing Cunningham v. Central Beverage Inc., 486 F. Supp. 59, 62-63 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
115. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d at 1394 (citing Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531
n.1 (9th Cir. 1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 980 & n.9 (9th
Cir. 1981)); See also Reilly, 653 F. Supp. at 729 '("Because the provisions of the
ADEA parallel those of Title VII, many courts have applied the principles of Title VII
to cases involving age discrimination.") Id. (citing Dreyer v. ARCO Chem. Co., 801
F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987)); Berndt v. Kaiser Alumi-
num & Chem. Sales, Inc., 789 F.2d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 1986); Massarsky v. General
Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 117 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983); Douglas,
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ADEA cases that have applied Title VII disparate-impact analysis sup-
port its expanded application to Title IX litigation for a number of rea-
sons. First, the substantial number of ADEA cases employing reasoning
identical to Title IX cases such as Mabry and Lipsett provides strong
evidence that the approach used in those cases is being widely accepted.
Second, the ADEA cases show that disparate-impact analysis is workable
outside of the Title VII context. Third, the fact that a majority of lower
courts have accepted disparate-impact proof in ADEA cases,"' notwith-
standing the more limited scope of that statute,17 strengthens the argu-
ment for extending disparate-impact theory to Title IX litigation. For
example, language within ADEA evinces an intent by Congress to limit
the scope of the act. The ADEA allows employers to make policies based
on "reasonable factors other than age."". Chief Justice Rehnquist and
others believe this language forecloses the use of disparate-impact anal-
ysis in ADEA cases."9 "Under this view, the explicit protection for age-
656 F.2d at 532; Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 913 (1978)).
116. See supra note 114.
117. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 44, at 503. See also Steven J. Kaminshine,
The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination In Em-
ployment Act, 42 FIA. L. REv. 229 (1990). Kaminshine notes the widely held belief
that "Congress intended the ADEA to prohibit a narrower brand of discrimination
than that prohibited by Title VII . . . ." Id. at 299. See generally Smith & Leggette,
Recent Issues in Litigation Under the, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 41
OHIO ST. L.J. 349 (1980); Donald R. Stacey, A Case Against Extending the Adverse
Impact Doctrine to ADEA, 10 EMPLOYEE REL L.J. 439 (1985); Pamela S. Krop, Note,
Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1982).
Cf. Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1986). "The adverse impact
analysis developed in Title VII cases cannot be extended easily to age cases." Id. at
1428.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1988).
119. Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 94549 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). See also Kaminshine, supra note 117, at 301.
The treatment by courts of identical language in the Equal Pay Act of 1963
further supports this view. The Equal Pay Act states in pertinent part:
(d)(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this sec-
tion shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to em-
ployees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work
on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibili-
ty, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where
such payment is made pursuant to . . . (iv) a differential based on any other
factor other than sex.
neutral factors confines the statute to a disparate-treatment model of dis-
crimination."2 ' Unlike the ADEA, Title IX contains no such limiting lan-
guage. In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized the broad scope of
Title IX. In discussing whether Title IX applied to colleges that did not
accept direct federal assistance, the Court stated, "We have recognized
the need to 'accord [Title IXI a sweep as broad as its language,' and we
are reluctant to read into [Title IX] a limitation not apparent on its
face." 2 ' Thus, the argument for extending disparate-impact analysis to
Title IX is more persuasive than in ADEA cases.
This becomes even more apparent when the policy reasons for extend-
ing disparate-impact analysis are compared with the two statutes. The
Supreme Court's rationale for allowing disparate-impact proof in Title VII
cases focused on the historical discrimination against persons in Title
VII's protected class.2 ' However, unlike women and minorities,'3
there is a lack of historical discrimination against persons in ADEA's
protected class.2 The Supreme Court has opined that the aged do not
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Kouba court first noted that there were substantial reasons for using disparate-
impact analysis in a claim brought under the Equal Pay Act. However, the court went
on to state that, "We have found no authority giving guidance on the proper judicial
inquiry absent direct evidence of discriminatory intent." Id. at 876. See also County of
Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). The Supreme Court stated:
Title VII's prohibition of discriminatory employment practices was intended to
be broadly inclusive, proscribing "not only overt discrimination but also prac-
tices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." . . . The fourth
affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act, however, was designed differently,
to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex
discrimination .... [However,] we do not decide in this case how sex-based
wage discrimination litigation under Title VII should be structured to accom-
modate the fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ....
Id. at 170-71 (citations omitted).
120. Kaminshine, supra note 117, at 301.
121. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564 (1984) (first alteration in original)
(quoting both North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) and United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)). The legislative history also evinces Title
IX's broad scope. Senator Bayh, discussing the scope of Title IX, stated, "[Title IX] is
a strong and comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if we are to provide
women with solid legal protection as they seek education and training for later ca-
reers .... " 118 CONG. REc. 5806-07 (1972) (emphasis added).
122. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1971).
123. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457, U.S. 440, 447 (1982) (recognizing historical dis-
crimination against both blacks and women).
124. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per
curiam). See also Kaminshine, supra note 117, at 306. The author stated:
The policy argument against the inclusion of disparate impact under the
ADEA rests on two related claims: that age discrimination is different and
less invidious than discrimination based on race, and that the underlying
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have a "history of purposeful unequal treatment,"'26 and old age is not
an immutable characteristic. 2  The overwhelming majority of lower
courts that have accepted disparate-impact proof in ADEA cases'
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mandate the same treatment for Title IX litigants, given Title IX's broader
scope.'" However, before declaring a victory for Title IX plaintiffs, it is
important to consider the other significant federal statute that impacts
this area.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" is the other major anti-dis-
crimination statute. Title VI is particularly relevant when interpreting
Title IX because the language of Title IX mirrors that of Title VI. 33 Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court has often looked to Title VI for guidance when
construing Title IX. 3' Therefore, a review of the Court's treatment of
Title VI actions is essential to a full analysis of Title IX issues.
The principal Title VI case involving the disparate-impact issue is
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission." In Guardians,
the Supreme Court held that "the Court of Appeals erred in requiring
proof of intent."" In a complicated and convoluted opinion,"u the
function of disparate impact as developed in race cases does not apply in
the age setting.
Id.
125. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
126. Id. at 313-14. See also Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1428 (7th Cir.
1986) (quoting Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting
that age, unlike race, sex and national origin, is not an immutable characteristic)).
127. See supra note 114.
128. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). Section 601 of Title VI states: "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
130. Title VI is identical to Title IX except that the phrase "on the basis of sex" in
Title IX was substituted for "on the ground of race, color, or national origin" in Title
VI. See id. and supra text accompanying note 16.
131. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1032 (1992) (noting
that Title IX and Title VI case law has evolved along parallel lines); Grove City Col-
lege v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984) ("Title IX was patterned after Title VI"); North
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 514 (1982) (Title IX designed after Title
VI); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 697-98 (1979) (prior interpretation
of Title VI dispositive on similar issue under Title IX).
132. 463 U.S. 582 (1983). "The threshold issue before the Court is whether the pri-
vate plaintiffs in this case need to prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation
of Title VI .... " Id. at 584.
133. Id.
134. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035. In Franklin Justice White, who wrote the
Court found that Title VI itself required proof of intent. ' However, a
majority of the Court, writing in separate opinions, ruled that a showing
of discriminatory impact will suffice to establish liability when the lit-
igant brings suit under Title VI's implementing regulations, rather than
the statute itself."u The Title VI regulations upon which the claim is
premised, however, must evince a prohibition on discriminatory ef-
fects. ' In Guardians, the Court noted that the Title VI enforcing agen-
cy had promulgated regulations prohibiting disparate-impact discrimina-
tion.'" Justice White, writing for the majority, gave deference to the reg-
ulations and stated, "I discern nothing in the legislative history of Title
Guardians opinion, noted "the difficulty of inferring the common ground among the
Justices in that case . . . ." Id.
135. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 n.2.
136. Id. See also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-94 (1985) (reaffirming that
disparate-impact claims may be brought under Title VI regulations); Gomez v. Illinois
State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1987) (A disparate-impact claim
can be made under the regulations of Title VI, but, absent a showing of intentional
discrimination, no relief can be obtained under the title itself.).
Footnote two of the Guardians opinion summarizes the differences of the Justic-
es in that case. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 n.2. Footnote two reads in full:
The five of us reach the conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred by dif-
ferent routes. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice
Blackmun, reasons that, although Title VI itself requires proof of discriminato-
ry intent, the administrative regulations incorporating a disparate-impact stan-
dard are valid. Justice Marshall would hold that, under Title VI itself, proof
of disparate-impact discrimination is all that is necessary. I agree with Justice
Marshall that discriminatory animus is not an essential element of a violation
of Title VI. I also believe that the regulations are valid, even assuming, argu-
endo, that Title VI, in and of itself, does not proscribe disparate-impact dis-
crimination.
Id. (citations omitted).
137. Id. See also Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992). "Although in Guardians the Court did
hold that regulations promulgated under Title VI can give rise to claims of disparate
impact, Podberesky has cited no regulations in his complaint or otherwise attempted
to prove any regulatory disparate impact claim." Id. at 378 (citations omitted).
The regulations that the Court relied on in Guardians that evidenced a prohibi-
tion of discriminatory effects were 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(i) of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development and 29 C.F.R. § 31.3(c)(1) of the Office of the Sec-
retary of Labor. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 587 (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1285-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)) (Supreme Court did not cite the
regulations directly, but merely referred to the district court's use of them.). 24
C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(1) (1992), states that a participant in a federally funded program
may not "utilize criteria or methods of administration which ... have the effect of
defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the pro-
grain . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). 29 C.F.R. § 31.3(c)(1) (1992) states that a recipi-
ent of federal funds "may not (directly or through contractual or other arrange-
ments) subject an individual to discrimination . Id. (emphasis added).
138. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 592.
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VI... that is at odds with the administrative construction of the stat-
utory terms."" Therefore, a disparate-impact claim may be brought un-
der the Title VI regulations.
The similarity in language between the two statutes"4 and the Su-
preme Court's reliance on Title VI when interpreting Title IX... have led
most lower courts to look for guidance from Guardians.' In Sharif v.
New York State Education Department," a Title IX claim of sex dis-
crimination was brought against the New York State Education Depart-
ment. " The plaintiffs argued that the defendant's policy of depending
solely on SAT' scores in granting scholarships disparately affected fe-
male students in violation of Title IX and its implementing regula-
tions." After noting that the Supreme Court had not decided whether
139. Id. It is a long-standing policy of the Supreme Court to give deference to regu-
lations promulgated by the agency responsible for enforcement of the statute in
question. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 74 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)) (adminis-
trative guidelines of Title VII promulgated by EEOC entitled to great deference);
EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) ("EEOC's interpre-
tation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference.");
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 381 (1987) (administrative interpretation entitled to
deference); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) ("'[Tlhe adminis-
trative interpretation of [a statute] by the enforcing agency . . . [is] entitled to great
deference.'") (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34)); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (administrative guidelines entitled
to great deference); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969)
(administrative construction entitled to deference).
140. See supra note 130.
141. See supra note 131.
142. See Pfeiffer v. Board of Sch. Directors, 917 F.2d 779 (3rd Cir. 1990). The Pfef-
fer court acknowledged the relationship in the interpretations of Title IX and Title VI
and held that "we believe that the standard adopted for Title VI actions in Guard-
ians Ass'n should be required in Title IX cases." Id. at 788 (deciding case on other
grounds). See also Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185,
1193 (S.D.N.Y 1988), affd, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989) (adopting Guardians approach
in Title IX claim of discriminatory effect); Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dept., 709
F. Supp. 345, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (relying on Guardians in Title IX case of disparate-
impact discrimination): Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(citing Guardians in holding that Title IX claimant may use disparate-impact analysis
under Title IX regulations).
143. 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
144. Id. at 360.
145. SAT stands for Scholastic Aptitude Test.
146. Sharif, 709 F. Supp. at 360. The plaintiffs introduced testimony from expert
witnesses indicating that the SAT "underpredicts academic performance of females in
their freshman year of college, and overpredicts such academic performance for
disparate impact was applicable to Title IX cases, the district court
looked to Title VI and the Guardians opinion for instruction.47 The
district court found that the regulations promulgated under Title IX,
which should be accorded deference, 4 ' were as comprehensive as
those relied on in Guardians.' Like the Title VI regulations, the Title
IX regulations reviewed by the district court prohibited policies that had
a discriminatory effect."5 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs
could base their claim on the disparate impact of the defendant's practice. 5 '
males." Id. at 354. The plaintiffs also submitted statistical evidence that New York's
practice of basing scholarships exclusively on SAT scores invariably caused more
males than females to receive academic scholarships. Id. at 355.
147. Id. at 360-61.
148. See supra note 139.
149. Sharif, 709 F. Supp. at 361. The Sharif court referred to a number of Title IX
regulations which supported its conclusion. Id. The opinion cited 34 C.F.R.
§§ 106.21(b)(2), 106.22, 106.23(b), 106.34(d), 106.37(b), 106.52, and 106.53(b). Section
106.21(b)(2) states, "A recipient shall not administer or operate any test or other cri-
terion for admission which has a disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the
basis of sex . . . ." Section 106.22 states, "A recipient . . . shall not give preference
to applicants for admission . . .if the giving of such preference has the effect of dis-
criminating on the basis of sex in violation of this subpart." Section 106.23(b) states,
"A recipient . . . shall not recruit primarily .. .at educational institutions . . .which
admit as students only or predominantly members of one sex, if such actions have
the effect of discriminating on the basis of sex . . . ." Section 106.34(d) states,
"Where use of a single standard of measuring skill . . .in a physical education class
has an adverse effect on members of one sex, the recipient shall use appropriate
standards which do not have such effect." Section 106.37(b) states, "A recipient may
administer or assist in the administration of scholarships ... which requires that
awards be made to members of a particular sex .. ; provided, that the overall ef-
fect . . .does not discriminate on the basis of sex." Section 106.52 states, "A recipi-
ent shall not administer . . . any test ... for any employment opportunity which has
a disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the basis of sex . . . ." Section
106.53(b) states, "A recipient shall not recruit primarily ...at entities which furnish
as applicants ...predominately members of one sex if such actions have the effect
of discriminating on the basis of sex . . . ." (Emphasis added).
Using the rationale of Sharif, supported by Guardians, a Title IX plaintiff should
be able to use disparate-impact proof of discrimination if her claim is based on any
of the above cited Title IX regulations.
150. Sharif, 709 F. Supp. at 361. For a detailed examination of the regulations re-
viewed by the Sharif court see supra note 149.
151. Id. The district court then applied the disparate-impact analysis to the
plaintiffs' case and held that a prima facie case had been shown. Id. at 362. The
court found the plaintiffs' statistical evidence, showing that women were far less
likely than men to obtain scholarships based on SAT scores, to be convincing. Id.
The court then opined that the plaintiffs could have won under the second stage of
the analysis because the defendants failed to show an educational necessity for its
practice. Id. However, the court stated that even if the defendants prevailed at that
stage, they would have lost under the third part of the analysis. Id. at 363-64. The
court found that there were alternatives to relying solely on SAT scores, for example,
the defendants could have also factored in high school grades. Id.
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The court in Haffer v. Temple University" used a similar approach,
although possibly somewhat broader than that taken in Sharif. In Haffer
the defendants argued that Title IX only prohibited intentional discrimi-
nation." However, the district court promptly dismissed that argu-
ment. " The court reasoned that, similar to the Title VI regulations at
issue in Guardians, the Title IX regulations in the case sub judice did
not impose an intent. requirement."s Specifically, the district court stat-
ed that the "Title IX regulations ... do not explicitly impose an intent
requirement.""s The court's language implied that disparate-impact
treatment applies not only to Title IX regulations that are phrased in
terms of "effects," but also to regulations that do not specifically require
intent. The district court's reference to Guardians'57 may indicate that
the court did not intend to broaden the scope of disparate-impact analy-
sis in this manner." However, this change in language, from requiring
a regulation to prohibit discriminatory effects to requiring a mere show-
ing that the regulation does not specifically impose an intent require-
ment, may allow greater latitude to Title IX disparate-impact plaintiffs.
These cases illustrate the trend of allowing disparate-impact proof to
establish sex discrimination in Title IX cases. However, the reliance on
Title' VI and Guardians by these courts may limit "effects" analysis to
those claims brought under Title IX's regulations, which prohibit practic-
es that disproportionately impact women.
152. 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
153. Id. at 536. The defendant claimed that because there was no evidence of inten-
tional discrimination, its conduct was not actionable under Title IX. Id. at 536-37. It
is important to note that the plaintiffs in Haffer alleged violations of both Title IX
and its implementing regulations. Id. at 539. Moreover, proof of discriminatory effect
suffices to establish liability when suit is brought to enforce the regulations rather
than the statute itself. Id. The case focused on the University's alleged sexual dis-
crimination in its disparately-impacting treatment of women in the intercollegiate pro-
grams. Id. at 521.
154. Id. at 539-40.
155. Id. at 539.
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. The court did not hold that Title IX is broader than Title VI. The district judge
stated that, "As there is no reason that a Title IX plaintiff should have a higher bur-
den of proof than a Title VI plaintiff, I hold that plaintiffs need not prove discrim-
inatory intent to succeed on their claim." Id. at 539-40 (citing both Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) and Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Medical Ctr.,
677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983)).
IV. CONCLUSION
The lower courts, confronted with the question of whether disparate-
impact analysis is applicable to Title IX cases of sex discrimination in
education, have all answered in the affirmative."s A minority of lower
courts have applied the substantive standards of Title VII disparate-im-
pact treatment directly in Title IX litigation."W These courts have fo-
cused on the identical objective of the two statutes: the prohibition of
sex discrimination.
16 1
The majority of courts have extended disparate-impact analysis to
those cases in which the plaintiff has brought a claim based on Title IX
regulations expressly prohibiting those policies which have a discrimina-
tory effect on women." Courts taking this approach have relied on the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VI, after which Title IX was pat-
temed. " Other courts may allow disparate-impact treatment when the
Title IX regulations do not specifically require a showing of intent."M
The better approach is that taken by those courts that apply Title VII's
substantive standards outright in Title IX litigation. Congress enacted
Title IX to prohibit sexual discrimination in education." Requiring
proof of intentional discrimination does injustice to the statute's broad
purpose." Title IX prohibits sexual discrimination. Title IX has no lan-
guage suggesting that only intentional discrimination is forbidden. Under
the rules of construction enunciated by the Supreme Court, if Congress
had intended such a limitation, it could easily have done so."
Further, the important interest in eradicating the effects of societal dis-
crimination that led the Supreme Court to recognize disparate-impact
analysis in Title VII cases is also present in Title IX actions."M Those
interests, combined with the similar objectives of the two statutes,M
and the important goal of affording women equal educational opportuni-
ties, 7 ° highlight the need to afford Title IX as broad a reach as Title VII.
159. See supra notes 105-09, 142-55 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 15.
166. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
167. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982). Congress can
easily limit the scope of a statute through language showing a clear intent. Id. The
fact that it did not is an indication that it did not intend to limit the scope. Id.
168. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
169. Both Title IX and Title VII prohibit sex discrimination. See supra notes 16, 98
and accompanying text.
170. See comments of Senator Bayh, supra note 5. See also statements of Repre-
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However, the Supreme Court's reliance on its interpretation of Title VI
when construing Title IX'7 will likely result in its adoption of the
Guardians disparate-impact approach in cases involving Title IX claims.
Therefore, plaintiffs bringing a disparate-impact sex discrimination claim
against an educational institution should base their cases on a violation
of Title IX regulations prohibiting discriminatory effects.
sentative Mink, supra note 15. See generally Civil Rights-Disparate-Impact Doctrine,
supra note 6, at 807.
171. See supra note 131.

